Methods of enterprise management: a concrete economic approach

Among the problems of analysis of the transition economy is onefrom the central places are the problems of transforming the methods of corporate management of property relations. In fact, it was the redistribution and clear consolidation of property rights and methods of enterprise management that were once declared one of the main goals of economic reforms in the countries of the former USSR. In pursuit of this goal, national governments implemented and implemented large-scale privatization programs, developed corporate legislation, and created new organizational and administrative methods of enterprise management. The course of reforms attracts close attention of researchers. In a number of works on economics, the problems of the evolution of corporate governance are analyzed, and the efficiency of enterprise management is assessed from the point of view of modern approaches to research in conditions of market transformations.

A question that is very often at the momenteconomists are asked is why, despite the large program of mass privatization designed to actually create a property rights market, despite serious efforts to launch redistribution processes, the distribution of formal and, in particular, informal property rights, the methods of enterprise management in post-Soviet companies by are still far from the ideal sought by the authors of the reforms. Why do internal control internalization continue to exist in these corporations, a situation in which the company's management turns out to be independent of any external influence, even if a formally significant part of the assets belongs to external owners?

The most common approach to analysisThe situation around corporate governance is largely microeconomic. That is, in fact, the situation is analyzed from the standpoint of a particular corporation, factors that allow the company's management to ignore the interests of external investors, apply methods of managing the enterprise that are convenient only to them and successfully pursue their own interests. At the same time, special attention is paid to the inefficiency of legislation and the judicial system. To deny the importance of legal factors is impossible: as studies show, the distribution of control in corporations really is quite clearly dependent on the quality of corporate legislation and the effectiveness of mechanisms for its implementation. However, it seems that the consideration of these factors as given, limits our knowledge about the subject, makes them fragmentary. Legislation and public policy are the product of the struggle of various interest groups. This also applies to legislation regulating the relationship between the real and financial sectors.

Consequently, the root causes that determine the coursethe evolution of corporate governance, the methods of enterprise management, should be sought in the structural features of the corresponding economic system. Analysis of methods, technologies and procedures of corporate governance in the economy can and should be supplemented by addressing specific economic factors of the formation of a particular management system, of a particular distribution of control. This thesis is intended to realize two main goals: the first - to formulate a theoretical problem related to the notion of corporate governance, and the second - to motivate precisely the economic approach to the analysis of the evolution of corporate governance and property relations.